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The Missing Justice in
Coleman v. Miller
BARRY CUSHMAN
A mystery has surrounded the 1939 case
of Coleman v. Miller.1 The case concerned
the status of the proposed Child Labor
Amendment, which Congress had passed in
1924 but which had yet to be ratified by the
requisite number of states. In January 1925,
the Kansas state legislature had adopted a
resolution rejecting the proposed amendment.
In January 1937, however, the state senate
had divided evenly on a resolution to ratify
the amendment, and the state’s Lieutenant
Governor had cast the deciding vote in favor
of ratification. The lower house then adopted
a resolution of ratification. Members of the
legislature, claiming that the Lieutenant
Governor had no right to vote on the senate
resolution, brought an action in mandamus
seeking to restrain various state officers from
taking steps to certify that the legislature had
ratified the amendment. The petition also
contended that the proposed amendment was
stale and no longer subject to ratification
because it had not been ratified within a
reasonable time. The state supreme court
found that the Lieutenant Governor had been
entitled to vote on the resolution, that the
proposed amendment remained vital and
subject to ratification, and that the legislature
had ratified the amendment. That court
therefore denied the writ of mandamus.2
The threshold question before the Su-
preme Court of the United States was whether
the Court had jurisdiction over the contro-
versy. More particularly, the issue was
whether the members of the state legislature
who had brought the action had standing to
seek a writ of certiorari. In the published
opinion, the Court split on this issue 5-4, with
Justices Owen J. Roberts, Hugo L. Black, and
William O. Douglas joining Felix Frankfurt-
er’s opinionmaintaining that the Court lacked
jurisdiction because the petitioners lacked
standing.3 The numerical vote had been the
same when the Justices met in Conference to
deliberate on April 22, 1939, but the line-up
had been different. On that occasion, Justice
James C.McReynolds had taken the view that
the Court lacked jurisdiction, while Roberts
had voted to recognize jurisdiction. These
two Justices switched places between the date
of the Conference and the announcement of
the Court’s decision.4
The second question was whether to
affirm the judgment of the state court on the
merits. Here the vote in the published
decision was 7-2. Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes’s opinion for the Court held that the
question of whether the ratification of the
amendment was effective in view of its earlier
rejection by the state legislature was a
political question to be determined by
Congress.5 Hughes further opined that the
question of whether the amendment had lost
its vitality through lapse of time was similarly
non-justiciable.6 Roberts, Frankfurter, and
Douglas joined Black’s concurring opinion,
which underscored their view that Congress
alone held exclusive power over the political
process of constitutional amendment, and that
the courts had no business pronouncing upon
that process.7 McReynolds joined Justice
Pierce Butler’s dissent, which maintained
that the proposed amendment was no longer
subject to ratification because it had not
been ratified within a reasonable time.
Butler’s opinion did not speak to the issue
of the legislature’s previous rejection of the
proposed amendment.8 Here again, however,
the ultimate vote was at variance with the
Conference tally. At the Conference, McRey-
nolds had not voted on the merits, passing
because of his view that the Court did not
have jurisdiction of the case. Justices Harlan
Fiske Stone and Roberts had been with Butler
in dissent, though it appears from the question
marks that Stone placed next to his and
Roberts’s votes in his record of the Confer-
ence that their votes to reverse had been
tentative.9 Stone ultimately joined Hughes on
the merits, and Roberts ultimately joined
Black. The deserted Butler had to be consoled
by McReynolds’s election to join him in
dissent.
There is nothing particularly mysterious
about any of these events. But there was a
third merits issue in Coleman, which was not
disaggregated in the tallies recorded at the
April 22 Conference but that was given brief,
separate treatment in Hughes’s opinion. The
petitioners claimed that the Lieutenant
Governor was not a part of the “legislature”
under the Kansas constitution as it had been
construed by the state’s highest court, and
therefore he was not eligible under
Article V of the federal Constitution to cast
the deciding vote on ratification. And herein
lies the mystery. For Hughes’s published
opinion reported that “[w]hether this conten-
tion presents a justiciable controversy, or a
question which is political in its nature and
hence not justiciable, is a question upon
which the Court is equally divided and
therefore the Court expresses no opinion
upon that point.”10
Scholars understandably have been puz-
zled by how a decision in which all nine of the
Justices participated could have been
“equally divided” on this issue. Shortly after
the decision was handed down, the Yale Law
Journal published an anonymous Note,
which Bennett Boskey later attributed to
Yale Law Professor Harry Shulman,11 enti-
tled “Sawing a Justice in Half.”12 “Opinions
of the Supreme Court delivered in the last
weeks of this Term,” the author wrote,
“exhibit a capacity in that Court for division
sufficient to confound prophets and critics of
all schools—legalistic, metaphysical, psy-
chological and economic. But the division in
Coleman v. Miller, recorded June 5th, should
astonish even a Yogi magician.”13 After
surveying the various possibilities, the author
concluded that
[o]nly Justices McReynolds and
Butler could properly refuse to
consider the question; for they voted
for the petitioners on other grounds
and therefore could have found it
unnecessary to pass upon additional
reasons supporting the same conclu-
sion. Yet, failing to carry a majority
on those grounds, they were under
some duty to see whether they could
68 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY
find a majority for their result on any
of the other grounds urged.14
The still-perplexed author was left with a
series of questions: “What really did happen?
Did a Justice refuse to vote on this issue? And
if he did, was it because he could not make up
his mind? Or is it possible to saw a Justice
vertically in half during a conference and
have him walk away whole?”15
It would be more than half a century
before an answer to these questions would
find its way into print. In a conversation
published in 2007, Boskey related that:
I later found out through Felix
Frankfurter what had really happened
in that case. JusticeMcReynolds,who
was a very ornery Justice, used to go
off a little bit early before the end of
the Term on vacation. And in this
particular case, the point involvedwas
a new point that came up after Justice
McReynolds had gone off on vaca-
tion.And nobodywas going to try and
call him back—he would have told
them, frankly, “Go to hell.” He
wouldn’t have come back. SoHughes
just said, “On this issue, the Court is
evenly divided.”16
This Frankfurter/Boskey account never
has been contradicted, but neither has it been
corroborated. As I shall demonstrate, the
Justices’ papers and contemporary news
James C. McReynolds missed the Court’s final Conference on June 3, 1939 to return to his hometown of
Elkton, Kentucky (pictured is his childhood home) to attend “a family reunion and celebration.” The Court had
announced on May 1 that it would adjourn for the summer on May 29, and McReynolds stuck by his
commitment to attend the Elkton festivities.
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reports make it possible to determine with a
high degree of confidence that McReynolds
was indeed absent from the final meeting
during which the Justices met to deliberate on
the case. Yet those sources also cast doubt on
some aspects of the Frankfurter/Boskey
account.
Coleman was delivered on the final
opinion day of the Term, June 5, 1939. On
May 30, Chief Justice Hughes wrote to his
colleagues that “[f]our opinions have been
circulated” in Coleman—those written by
Hughes, Black, Frankfurter, and Butler
—“and, in view of the shortness of time, it
seems to me desirable that we should have a
conference as soon as possible in order to
determine whether an opinion can be written
for the Court and, if so, what it shall
decide. Accordingly, I ask that the brethren
meet in conference tomorrow, Wednesday,
at noon.”17 We know that McReynolds was
absent from the Court’s final session on
June 5,18 and the docket books of his
colleagues reveal that he also did not attend
the Court’s final Conference on June 3.19
McReynolds’s premature departure, though
hardly commendable, may not, however,
have been quite as irresponsible as the
Frankfurter/Boskey account would suggest.
The Court had announced on May 1 that it
would adjourn for the summer on May 29,20
and McReynolds, who was traveling to his
birthplace for “a family reunion and celebra-
tion,”21 appears to have relied upon that
announcement in making his plans.
On June 16, McReynolds’s clerk for that
Term, Milton Musser, wrote to his mother
that “[t]he Justice returned to Washington
after having been away for twoweeks visiting
his old home in Kentucky.”22 Musser’s letter
does not supply specific dates of travel, but
theWashington Post reported on June 12 that
McReynolds had left his boyhood home in
Elkton the preceding day in order to attend the
funeral of Judge Charles H. Robb on
Tuesday, June 13.23 An absence of two
weeks would place McReynolds’s departure
from Washington on May 30 or May 31. On
June 2, 1939, the Paducah Sun-Democrat
ran a story with the headline “Justice
McReynolds Picks Elkton Visit over Fete
for King.” With a dateline from Elkton on
June 2, the story related that McReynolds had
declined an invitation to meet the King and
Queen of Great Britain at a June 8 garden
party held at the British embassy in Wash-
ington “because,” as he told his interviewer in
Elkton, “I simply preferred to be here.”24
This evidence alone would suggest that
McReynolds probably had left Washington
by the time that the Justices convened on
May 31. The journey from Washington to
Elkton is one of approximately 725 miles.
McReynolds allocated two days for his
return trip from Elkton to Washington for
Judge Robb’s funeral, so he probably would
have allocated the same amount of time for
his transit from Washington to Elkton.
McReynolds liked to travel in his 1929
six-cylinder Buick couple convertible, and
he may well have journeyed by car to Elkton
that year. Though he was reportedly an
aggressively fast driver, he would not have
covered the distance from Washington to
Elkton on the roads of 1939 in a single day.
On a 1936 drive from Washington to West
Point, for example, a journey of under 300
miles, McReynolds allocated two days for
transit, stopping for the first night at Delaware
Water Gap, approximately 240 miles from
Washington.25 A journey from Washington
to Elkton by train likewise would have
consumed more than a single day. Even in
1947, the trip from Washington to Cincinnati
on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad was one of
eleven and one-half hours.26 The connecting
train on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad
to Guthrie, Kentucky, which might have
required an overnight stay in Cincinnati,
would as late as 1958 still have consumed
another six and one-half hours.27 McRey-
nolds would then have faced a ten-mile
journey to Elkton on the Guthrie & Elkton
Railroad or possibly transportation by
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automobile. Whether he traveled by car or by
train, if McReynolds was in Elkton early
enough on June 2 to grant an interview that
would be published in Paducah’s evening
newspaper, then he probably would have
departed Washington no later than May 31.
Any remaining doubt about McRey-
nolds’s presence at the May 31 Conference
is removed, however, by the June 3 dateline
edition of Drew Pearson and Robert S.
Allen’s Washington Merry-Go-Round col-
umn. Two days before the even division in
Coleman was announced, the authors re-
ported that McReynolds would not be present
with his hardworking colleagues for the
Court’s June 5 session because he would be
“taking things easy” in Elkton. “The Court
originally had fixed its adjournment date for
May 29,” Pearson and Allen noted, but
“under the pressure of an extra heavy docket,
Chief Justice Hughes added another week to
the term in order to clean up unfinished cases.
Meanwhile McReynolds had arranged a
reunion in Elkton and refused to change his
plans notwithstanding the uncompleted cal-
endar. He sat with the court on May 29, but
the next day packed his bag and started on his
vacation while his colleagues remained at
their desks.”28
It appears clear, therefore, that McRey-
nolds was in fact the missing Justice in
Coleman. Nevertheless, elements of the
Frankfurter/Boskey report appear to be
misleading. First, though McReynolds cer-
tainly was eminently capable of being “very
ornery” orworse, the intimation that it was his
custom to leave for vacation before the
conclusion of the Court’s Term appears to
be an embellishment. He did so in 1939, to be
sure, but an examination of the docket books
from 1922 to 1940 reveals only one other
instance in which McReynolds was absent
In leaving town early, McReynolds declined an invitation to attend a garden party reception at the British
Embassy for King George VI and Queen Elizabeth. Pictured are the King, President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
General Edwin M. Watson, Eleanor Roosevelt, and the Queen posing outside Union Station on June 8.
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from the final Conference.29 And as men-
tioned above, the 1939 instance was one in
which the Court previously had announced
plans to adjourn a week earlier. Surely it was
at the very least “ornery” to depart prior to
the actual conclusion of the Term, but
McReynolds may have been honoring com-
mitments that he had made in reliance on the
Court’s earlier announcement.
Second, as Hughes surely knew when he
sent out his May 30 letters to his colleagues
calling for a Conference on Coleman on
May 31, McReynolds had just departed on a
journey that would consume at least two days.
If Hughes knew byMay 29 that he would call
a special Conference on Coleman, he could
have communicated (and perhaps did
communicate) that to McReynolds prior to
the latter’s departure. But if Hughes did not
know this until May 30, the earliest that he
could have reached McReynolds would have
been upon the Justice’s arrival at his hotel on
the evening of May 30, and perhaps not until
his arrival in Elkton on May 31. Hughes
clearly thought it necessary to resolve the
remaining issues in Coleman before the
Court’s regular Conference on June 3. Even
had McReynolds returned to Washington as
soon as he had heard from Hughes, he could
not have been present for a Conference before
June 1 if he had been reached in transit on
May 30, or June 3 if reached in Elkton on
May 31. It is not as if McReynolds already
was settled at a nearby vacation destination
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes (left) felt compelled to add another week to the Term to clean up
unfinished cases, including the Coleman v. Miller case that centered on whether the Lieutenant Governor of
Kansas had the right to vote to break a tie in the state senate on a resolution to ratify the Child Labor
Amendment. Above are Hughes and McReynolds in May 1938 leaving Holy Trinity Church after attending the
funeral of Frank Key Green, who had served as the Marshal of the Supreme Court for twenty-three years.
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and could return to participate in the discus-
sion within what Hughes regarded as the
necessary time frame. Hughes might have
been able to contact McReynolds when he
was either halfway to or had arrived in Elkton
and asked him to return to discuss the
question on which the Justices were evenly
divided. And though McReynolds held
Hughes in high regard,30 one cannot be
certain that, under such circumstances,
McReynolds would not have told the Chief
Justice to “go to hell.”31 But that is probably
not why Hughes did not reach out to his
departed colleague.
Because the question of whether the
Lieutenant Governor was eligible to vote had
been briefed and argued by the parties,32 and
because the original draft of Hughes’s
opinion had contained over five pages of
text deciding the issue on the merits in favor
of the officer’s eligibility,33 that issue cannot
have been “a new point that came up” so late
in the deliberations. Instead, it appears that
the precise issue of whether the Lieutenant
Governor’s eligibility to vote presented a
non-justiciable political question, which the
parties had neither briefed nor argued, was “a
new point” raised by one of the Justices late in
the production of the opinions.
That Justice appears to have been Black,
who wrote in the margin of his copy of
Hughes’s draft opinion that the issue of the
Lieutenant Governor’s eligibility presented “a
political question for Congress,”34 and scrib-
bled “by Congress though” next to Hughes’s
assertion that the issue presented “a federal
question to be determined in deciding whether
the ‘legislature’ has acted as required by
Article V.”35 In his concurring opinion, which
was joined by Roberts, Frankfurter, and
Douglas, Black asserted that “whether sub-
mission, intervening procedure or Congres-
sional determination of ratification conforms
to the command of the Constitution, calls for
decisions by a ‘political department’ of
questions of a type which this Court has
frequently designated ‘political.’”36 Black
went on to disapprove of “judicial review of
or pronouncements . . . as to whether duly
authorized state officials have proceeded
properly in ratifying or voting for ratification”
as “judicial interference” in “matters that we
believewere intrusted [sic] by theConstitution
solely to the political branch of govern-
ment.”37 The Amendment process, Black
insisted, was “‘political’ in its entirety, from
submission until an amendment becomes part
of the Constitution, and is not subject to
judicial guidance, control, or interference at
any point.”38
Hughes’s draft opinionmade clear that he
disagreed with Black, Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas on the question of the justicia-
bility of the issue of the Lieutenant Gover-
nor’s eligibility, and it appears that Stone and
Justice Stanley Reed agreed with him. Justice
Butler’s dissenting opinion closed by observ-
ing that the question of whether the issue of
the proposed amendment’s vitality was non-
justiciable “was not raised by the parties or by
theUnited States appearing as amicus curiae.”
Neither had that question been suggested by
the Court when it ordered re-argument. It
therefore would be inappropriate, Butler
opined, “without hearing argument on the
point,” to hold that the Court lacked power to
decide the question of whether the amend-
ment was no longer subject to ratification.39
Though his opinion did not speak to the issue
of the Lieutenant Governor’s eligibility,
Butler may well have taken a similar view
of the claim that the Court should declare
that issue non-justiciable without appropriate
briefing and argument. In any event, it appears
that Butler joined Hughes, Stone, and Reed in
opposing those who supported Black’s posi-
tion, producing a 4-4 tie. It appears that
McReynolds simplywas not there to break the
deadlock.
Even if McReynolds had been present,
however, it is not certain that he would have
cast a vote on the issue. Douglas noted in his
docket book that, at the April 22 Conference,
“McReynolds having voted to dismiss did not
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vote on the merits.”40 Even though he had lost
on the jurisdictional issue, McReynolds
nevertheless refused at Conference to engage
the merits issues that his colleagues would of
necessity address in view of the majority’s
holding that the petitioners had standing. As
is suggested by the Yale Law Journal Note,
McReynolds “could properly refuse to
consider the question” of the Lieutenant
Governor’s eligibility to vote on the Amend-
ment’s ratification in view of the fact that he
had voted to rule in favor of the petitioners on
other grounds. Even if he was, as the Note
author doubtfully intimated, “under some
duty” to “find a majority for [his] result on
any of the other grounds urged,”41 he may
have agreed with Hughes’s draft opinion that
the Lieutenant Governor was in fact eligible
to vote on ratification, and taking that position
would not have changed the outcome of the
case. In short, it may be that the irascible
Justice, who had declined to vote on any of
the merits issues at the original Conference,
would similarly have refused to vote on the
issue of the Lieutenant Governor’s eligibility
had he been present for the later special
Conference. McReynolds ultimately backed
his friend Butler on the question of the
proposed amendment’s vitality, and for this it
was necessary that he change his Conference
position–probably quite reluctantly, in light
of what we know of his jurisdictional
views42—on the threshold question of stand-
ing. But having thus disposed of the merits on
the ground that the proposed amendment was
no longer subject to ratification, McReynolds
might not have thought it necessary or proper
to reach the issue of the Lieutenant Gover-
nor’s eligibility. Indeed, the fact that Butler’s
dissenting opinion also did not speak to the
issue of the Kansas legislature’s previous
rejection of the proposed amendment may
have been a concession made to conciliate
McReynolds. McReynolds may have deter-
mined not to reach themerits of either of these
issues before departing on May 30, and he
may have made that determination known
before his departure. If so, Hughes would
have been fully aware of the futility of
recalling McReynolds for the special Confer-
ence. Thus, it may not have mattered that
McReynolds was in fact themissing Justice in
Coleman v. Miller.
Author’s Note: Thanks to Matthew
Hofstedt, Kent Olson, and Janet Rose for
excellent research assistance, and to John
Harrison for helpful conversation.
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